

## Message Text

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TO ALL AFRICAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY PRIORITY  
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AMEMBASSY BONN PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY

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FOLLOWING REPEAT SECTO 27094 ACTIONS SECSTATE, INFO USINFO,  
KINSHASA, LONDON, LUSAKA, NAIROBI, PRETORIA DTD 15 SEP 76.

QTE: UNCLAS SECTO 27094

FOR SPRS; DEPT PASS NSC FOR MR SCOWCROFT AND WHITE  
HOUSE FOR MR NESSEN

USINFO FOR IPS/PA, IBS/PA, IAA

E.O. 11652: N/A  
TAGS: OVIP, (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)  
SUBJECT: SECVISIT: SECRETARY'S ARRIVAL STATEMENT

HEREWITH TEXT OF SECRETARY'S NEWS CONFERENCE AT HOTEL  
KILIMANJARO, DAR ES SALAAM, TANZANIA SEPT 15, 1976  
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SECRETARY. I UNDERSTAND THIS IS A DAY OF PRESS CONFERENCES.  
WE WILL GO RIGHT TO THE QUESTIONS.

1. MR SECRETARY, WE'VE JUST COME FROM A PRESS CONFERENCE WITH

PRESIDENT NYERERE WHICH WAS, TO SAY THE LEAST, NOT ENCOURAGING FOR YOUR MISSION. ON BOTH THE NAMIBIAN AND THE RHODESIAN QUESTIONS HE SAID HE RECEIVED NOTHING OF ENCOURAGEMENT. IN FACT, ON THE NAMIBIAN QUESTION HE SAID HE IS NOW LESS HOPEFUL THAN BEFORE. DOES THIS REFLECT YOUR VIEWS ON THE FUTURE?

SECRETARY. I HAVE SAID FROM THE BEGINNING THAT WHATEVER CAN BE ACHIEVED DEPENDS ON THE ATTITUDE OF THE PARTIES. ALL THE UNITED STATES CAN DO IS TO ENABLE THE PARTIES TO DEAL WITH EACH OTHER; TO BRING WHATEVER IDEAS THEY HAVE; OCCASIONALLY TO OFFER A SUGGESTION, BASED ON THEIR KNOWLEDGE OF HAVING TALKED TO THE PARTIES, OF WHAT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. BUT ULTIMATELY IT IS UP TO THE PARTIES TO DECIDE. NOTHING HAS CHANGED FROM WHAT WAS KNOWN A WEEK AGO. AND THEREFORE I CANNOT MAKE JUDGMENTS BASED ON FLUCTUATING MOODS.

Q. MR SECRETARY, ISN'T THE FACT ALONE THAT NOTHING HAS CHANGED SINCE LAST WEEK AN UNHOPEFUL SIGN?

SECRETARY. NO, NOTHING COULD CHANGE SINCE LAST WEEK, SINCE THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES -- THE PURPOSE OF MY VISIT HERE WAS TO GET CLEAR ABOUT THE VIEW OF TANZANIA. IT WILL THEN TAKE THE VIEWS OF THE FRONT LINE PRESIDENTS TO PRETORIA AND THEN I WILL RETURN TO LUSAKA AND HERE. AT THAT POINT WE WILL BE ABLE TO JUDGE WHETHER ANY PROGRESS HAS BEEN MADE. BUT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO JUDGE THAT ON THE FIRST DAY.

Q. MR SECRETARY, ONE OF THE OTHER PURPOSES OF YOUR VISIT HERE WAS TO FIND OUT WHAT DECISIONS WERE TAKEN AT THE FIVE-NATION AFRICAN SUMMIT. CAN YOU GIVE US SOME IDEA AS TO WHAT THE CONSENSUS WAS AT THAT SUMMIT?

SECRETARY. I HAVE A RATHER CLEARER IDEA NOW OF WHAT THE VIEWS WERE. I DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT IS UP TO ME TO DISCUSS THE DECISIONS OF THE FIVE-NATION AFRICAN SUMMIT. I THINK THIS IS UNCLASSIFIED

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A QUESTION THAT SHOULD BE ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT NYERERE.

Q. MR SECRETARY, WHAT IF THE WORST COMES TO THE WORST? SHOULD THE PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS YOU ARE UNDERTAKING RIGHT NOW FAIL AND THE ARMED STRUGGLE IS INTENSIFIED, WHICH SIDE WILL THE UNITED STATES SUPPORT?

SECRETARY. WE CAN GIVE NO BLANK CHECKS IN ADVANCE. WE ARE HERE TO FIND PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS. WE HAVE AT THIS MOMENT NOT GIVEN UP EXPECTATIONS OF PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS, AND THAT IS A QUESTION THAT CAN BE ADDRESSED WHEN WE KNOW THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH MADE PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS IMPOSSIBLE.

1. WILL YOU CLARIFY THE FOUR POINTS PUT BY THE TANZANIAN

GOVERNMENT ON FEAR OF THE AMERICAN INTERVENTION IN THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA?

SECRETARY. THE UNITED STATES HAS MADE CLEAR ON MANY OCCASIONS THAT IT HAS NO INTENTION OF INTERVENING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE UNITED STATES PURSUES A POLICY THAT AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT SHOULD BE IN THE HANDS OF AFRICANS. WE ALSO OPPOSE THE INTERVENTION OF ANY OTHER OUTSIDE POWERS. THE UNITED STATES HAS NO INTENTION BY ITSELF TO INITIATE INTERVENTION IN AFRICA.

Q. MR SECRETARY, PRESIDENT NYERERE MADE CLEAR THAT HE THOUGHT ONLY THE SOUTH AFRICANS AND SWAPO SHOULD BE REPRESENTED AT A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE ON NAMIBIA. IS IT THE AMERICAN VIEW THAT THE TRIBAL AND ETHNIC GROUPS THAT WERE REPRESENTED AT THE WINDHOEK CONFERENCE SHOULD ALSO PARTICIPATE?

SECRETARY. THE UNITED STATES IS PUTTING FORWARD NO PROGRAM OF ITS OWN. THE UNITED STATES COMMUNICATES THE POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES, EACH TO THE OTHER, WITH THE EXPLANATION THAT EACH PARTY GIVES FOR ITS POSITION. AT THE END OF THAT PROCESS THE PARTIES WILL HAVE TO

DECIDE WHETHER THEY CAN RECONCILE THEIR DIFFERENCES. AND IN ANY NEGOTIATION EACH SIDE HAS A TENDENCY TO STATE ITS OPTIMUM CONDITIONS AT THE OUTSET, AND IF A SOLUTION IS REACHED, IT WILL DEPEND ON WHETHER THERE IS A WILLINGNESS TO COMPROMISE BY ONE OR BOTH SIDES, AND THAT DETERMINATION WILL HAVE TO BE MADE LATER.

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Q. MR SECRETARY, BOTH IN THE STATEMENT BY THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT YESTERDAY AND IN THE PRESS CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENT NYERERE, THERE WAS A STRONG IMPLICATION AND A FEAR EXPRESSED IN A WAY THAT YOUR APPROACH, THE AMERICAN APPROACH TOWARDS THE PROBLEMS OF SOUTHERN AFRICA, IS UNDULY OBSESSED WITH THE FEAR OF THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM HERE. SINCE THIS DOES SEEM TO BE A RATHER IMPORTANT FEAR HERE, I WONDER IF YOU WOULD ADDRESS YOURSELF TO IT?

SECRETARY. THEY ARE TWO SEPARATE PROBLEMS. WE DO NOT SAY THAT THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS ARE COMMUNIST, AND WE DO NOT FEAR THE LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, EITHER IN THEIR OWN RIGHT OR BECAUSE THEY ARE COMMUNIST. ON THE OTHER HAND, WE ARE CONCERNED WHEN THERE ARE INTERVENTIONS FROM OUTSIDE THE CONTINENT HERE. BUT, IN THEMSELVES, OUR CONCERN HERE IS TO HELP BRING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION, TO ENABLE THE PEOPLES OF THIS AREA TO MAKE PROGRESS. WE CAN ONLY REPEAT THAT THE LIVES THAT WILL BE SAVED WILL BE AFRICAN LIVES. THE PROGRESS THAT WILL BE MADE WILL BE AFRICAN PROGRESS. IT IS NOT SOMETHING FROM WHICH THE UNITED STATES BENEFITS AND IT IS NOT A PART OF AN ANTI-COMMUNIST CRUSADE AGAINST ANY PARTICULAR MOVEMENT BECAUSE IT IS PRECISELY THESE MOVEMENTS THAT WILL ULTIMATELY BENEFIT FROM A PEACEFUL SOLUTION.

GQ. MR SECRETARY, ON THE BASIS OF WHAT YOU HEA

RD HERE TODAY,  
ARE YOU MORE OR LESS HOPEFUL ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES OF FINDING  
A PEACEFUL SOLUTION?

SECRETARY. MY VIEWS ARE APPROXIMATELY THOSE WITH WHICH I CAME.  
THAT IS TO SAY, I HAVE HEARD THE VIEWS NOW EXPLAINED IN GREATER  
DETAIL BY THE PRESIDENT OF TANZANIA. I AM CERTAIN THAT, SINCE  
THIS IS THE BEGINNING OF THE PROCESS, THEY WERE NOT UNDERSTATED.  
THESE VIEWS HAVE BEEN EXPRESSED; THEY WILL BE FAITHFULLY  
CONVEYED IN PRETORIA. THE VIEWS OF THE OTHER SIDE WILL BE EQUALLY  
FAITHFULLY REPEATED HERE. I FOUND NO SURPRISES AND NOTHING TO  
CHANGE MY BASIC VIEW, WHICH IS THAT THE CHANCES ARE SOMEWHAT  
LESS THAN FIFTY-FIFTY; THAT THE WORST THAT CAN HAPPEN IF THIS  
MISSION DOES NOT SUCCEED IS WHAT IS CERTAIN TO HAPPEN WITHOUT  
THIS MISSION; THAT NO ONE ELSE WAS AVAILABLE -- NO OTHER  
COUNTRY WAS AVAILABLE -- TO UNDERTAKE IT; THAT THE EFFORT HAS TO  
BE MADE, AND IF IT SHOULD FAIL AND CONFLICT SHOULD PROVE  
UNAVOIDABLE, AT LEAST WE WILL KNOW IT IS NOT BECAUSE THE UNITED  
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STATES FAILED TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT.

Q. WOULD YOU BE ABLE TO CONFIRM WHAT PRESIDENT NYERERE SAID,  
AND THAT WAS THAT CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA TOOK PLACE ONLY  
AFTER SOUTH AFRICAN INTERVENTION?

SECRETARY. FIRST, I HOPE YOU ALL REALIZE I HAVE NOT SEEN A  
TRANSCRIPT OF PRESIDENT NYERERE'S PRESS CONFERENCE. OUR UNDER-  
STANDING IS THAT CUBANS WERE IN ANGOLA BEFORE SOUTH AFRICANS,  
AND I SEEM TO RECALL A SPEECH BY FIDEL CASTRO IN WHICH HE  
POINTED OUT THAT THE REASON THEY REINFORCED THE CUBANS IS BECAUSE  
SOME OF THEM HAD BEEN KILLED BY SOUTH AFRICANS, FROM WHICH ONE  
WOULD ASSUME THEY WERE THERE BEFORE THE SOUTH AFRICANS. BUT I  
WOULD HAVE TO CHECK THIS TO MAKE SURE.

Q. MR SECRETARY, ANOTHER THING PRESIDENT NYERERE INDICATED WAS  
THAT--IN FACT, HE SAID SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT--THAT HE DIDN'T  
UNDERSTAND HOW EVEN INTELLIGENT PEOPLE COULD BE SO PREOCCUPIED  
WITH THE SUBJECT OF CUBA. I THINK WE MIGHT INFER FROM THAT  
THAT THERE HAS BEEN RATHER A DIFFERENCE OF OPINION BETWEEN YOURSELF  
AND THE PRESIDENT ON THE SUBJECT. HAS IT COME UP?

SECRETARY. THE SUBJECT OF CUBA WAS NOT DISCUSSED BETWEEN  
PRESIDENT NYERERE AND MYSELF.

Q. MR SECRETARY, YESTERDAY THE TANZANIAN GOVERNMENT ASKED THAT THE  
UNITED STATES DECLARE ITS SUPPORT FOR THE FREEDOM FIGHTERS IN THE  
EVENT THAT NEGOTIATIONS FAIL. HAVE YOU GIVEN PRESIDENT NYERERE SUCH  
ASSURANCES OR ARE YOU PREPARED TO MAKE SUCH A DECLARATION OF  
SUPPORT?

SECRETARY. AS I HAVE INDICATED WE DO NOT OPERATE ON THE ASSUMPTION

THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL FAIL, AND UNTIL THE NEGOTIATIONS HAVE FAILED WE CANNOT MAKE ANY SUCH COMMITMENT.

Q. MR SECRETARY, PRESIDENT NYERERE PUT IT SLIGHTLY DIFFERENTLY TODAY. HE SAID THAT BECAUSE OF AN AMBIGUITY IT WOULD BE A GOOD THING IF THE UNITED STATES WOULD SAY IT WILL NOT HELP THOSE WHO ARE FIGHTING MAJORITY RULE, IN OTHER WORDS THE SMITH REGIME, IF THE GUERRILLA WAR SHOULD BECOME WORSE. CAN YOU --

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SECRETARY. WE STATED OUR POSITION IN THE LUSAKA SPEECH AND THIS REMAINS AMERICAN POLICY, AND I AM CONDUCTING MY CONVERSATIONS WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE PRIVATELY AND NOT BY COMMENTING ON HIS PRESS CONFERENCE.

Q. MR SECRETARY, CAN YOU AT THIS POINT CLARIFY AT ALL WHAT YOU REGARD AS THE SPECIFIC OBSTACLES YOU ARE FACING IN TRYING TO BE HELPFUL IN BOTH THE RHODESIAN AND THE NAMIBIAN SITUATIONS?

SECRETARY. IT IS CLEAR THAT A CONFLICT THAT HAS GONE ON FOR SO MANY YEARS AND HAS SUCH A LONG HISTORY HAS CREATED PROFOUND DISTRUST, AND SO MANY EFFORTS HAVE FAILED THAT THE PARTIES ARE BECOMING MORE AND MORE COMMITTED TO THE PROCESS OF STRUGGLE RATHER THAN TO THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION. I THINK THIS IS THE BASIC UNDERLYING OBSTACLE -- THE RELUCTANCE OF ANYBODY TO ADMIT THAT NEGOTIATIONS ARE POSSIBLE BEFORE THEY KNOW THAT NEGOTIATIONS WILL SUCCEED. AND OF COURSE THEY WILL NEVER FIND OUT WHETHER NEGOTIATIONS WILL SUCCEED UNTIL THEY FIRST ADMIT THAT THEY ARE POSSIBLE. THIS IS THE UNDERLYING DIFFICULTY. THEN THERE ARE MANY SPECIFIC ISSUES: THE COMPOSITION OF CONFERENCES, THE BASIC AGENDA THAT CONFERENCES MIGHT ADDRESS, WHAT ISSUES SHOULD BE DEALT WITH AS PRECONDITIONS, AND WHICH ISSUES CAN BE LEFT TO THE CONFERENCE. ALL OF THESE ARE BEFORE THE VARIOUS PARTIES AND ALL OF THESE WILL BE EXPLORED OVER THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

1. I'D LIKE TO FOLLOW THAT UP. HAVE YOU MADE AT THIS STAGE ANY ADVANCE IN THESE PROCEDURAL QUESTIONS?

SECRETARY. AN ADVANCE HAS BEEN MADE OVER THE TIME THAT THESE DISCUSSIONS STARTED. BUT IT WOULD BE RASH TO SAY THAT A SOLUTION IS IN SIGHT.

Q. WOULD THE PROCESS OF NEGOTIATION IN RHODESIA TOWARD MAJORITY RULE BE HASTENED IF THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT WERE TO BE REMOVED OR OTHERWISE REMOVED ITSELF?

SECRETARY. WE ARE DEALING WITH THE ISSUES AND NOT WITH THE PERSONALITIES AND STRUCTURES. WE ARE TELLING EACH SIDE WHAT WE BELIEVE THE REQUIREMENTS OF A SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION ARE. WHICH AUTHORITIES CARRY THIS OUT IS FOR THE PEOPLE CONCERNED TO DETERMINE.

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Q. EARLY THIS YEAR THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATED IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TRIPLE VETO WHICH SAVED SOUTH AFRICA FROM UNITED NATIONS MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS. WITH UNITED STATES NATIONAL INVESTMENTS AND POLITICAL INTERESTS IN SOUTH AFRICA, DO YOU REALLY THINK THE UNITED STATES CAN BE AN IMPARTIAL PEACE-MAKER IN SOUTHER AFRICA?

SECRETARY. ON MY VISIT TO AFRICA IN APRIL, EVERY AFRICAN LEADER THAT I SAW URGED ME TO GET IN TOUCH WITH PRIME MINISTER VORSTER SINCE IT WAS THEIR BELIEF THAT HE HELD THE KEY TO A SOLUTION IN SOUTHER AFRICA. WE WOULD NOT BE ENGAGED IN THIS PROCESS IF WE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT OUR INFLUENCE CAN BRING ABOUT PEACE, AND IN THE DIRECTION THAT HAS BEEN REQUESTED BY BLACK AFRICAN LEADERS. WHETHER IT WILL SUCCEED OR NOT IS FOR THE FUTURE TO DETERMINE AND DEPENDS ON THE ATTITUDE OF ALL OF THE PARTIES.;

Q. MR SECRETARY, PRESIDENT NYERERE SPOKE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A PROCLAMATION BETWEEN YOURSELF AND IAN SMITH BEING DRAWN UP. CAN YOU TELL US IF THIS WAS IN FACT DISCUSSED? AND SECONDLY, WAS THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION FOR WHITE SETTLERS IN RHODESIA DISCUSSED TODAY?

SECRETARY. THERE IS ABSOLUTELY NO POSSIBILITY OF A JOINT PROCLAMATION BETWEEN IAN SMITH AND THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THE QUESTION OF COMPENSATION -- THE ISSUE ISN'T COMPENSATION. THE QUESTION OF A FINANCIAL GUARANTEES PLAN WAS DISCUSSED AND MET WITH THE APPROVAL OF PRESIDENT NYERERE.

1. THE PRESIDENT SAID THAT THIS DID CROP UP. DO WE TAKE IT FROM THAT THAT YOU REJECTED THE QUESTION OF A JOINT PROCLAMATION?

SECRETARY. THE ISSUE OF A JOINT PROCLAMATION HAS NEVER COME UP, WAS NEVER DISCUSSED BETWEEN PRESIDENT NYERERE AND MYSELF, HAS NEVER BEEN REQUESTED BY THE RHODESIANS OR ANYBODY ELSE. INDEED, WE HAVE NOT BEEN IN TOUCH WITH THE RHODESIANS SO IT COULD NOT HAVE COME UP. AT ANY RATE THAT IS NOT A POSSIBILITY.

Q. MR SECRETARY, ONE OF THE APPARENT ISSUES OF DIFFERENCE, THOUGH, IS THAT PRESIDENT NYERERE SAID THAT IT WAS HIS BELIEF  
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THAT THE GREAT MAJORITY OF WHITES IN RHODESIA WOULD LEAVE. IS THAT AN AFRICAN CONSENSUS AND HOW DOES IT SQUARE WITH YOUR OWN VIEWS ON THE FUTURE OF RHODESIA?

SECRETARY. I DON'T KNOW WHETHER HE SAID SHOULD OR WOULD. AND OUR POSITION HAS BEEN THAT THE COMMUNITIES SHOULD BE ENABLED TO LIVE

TOGETHER, THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DISCRIMINATION OF ONE SIDE AGAINST THE OTHER BUT THAT THE FINAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMUNITIES IS ONE THAT HAS TO BE SETTLED BY A CONSTITUTIONAL CONFERENCE OR SOME OTHER DEVICE, WHICH IS AT THIS POINT PREMATURE.

Q. MR SECRETARY, I APPRECIATE YOUR PROBLEM ABOUT MASURING ANY DEGREE OF PROGRESS AT THIS PARTICULAR TIME. BUT AFTER ALL, YOU'VE HAD A WEEKEND OF TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER VORSTER; YOU'VE HAD TODAY WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE. DO YOU FIND, EVEN IN A TENTATIVE WAY, THE POSSIBILITY OF COINCIDING VIEWS THAT IN FACT MAKES YOU A TOUCH MORE OPTIMISTIC THAN YOU'RE PREPARED TO CONCEDE TODAY?

A. THERE ARE SEVERAL COINCIDING VIEWS, AND SEVERAL SHARPLY DIFFERENT VIEWS. THE QUESTION WHICH WE FACE IN THE NEXT WEEK IS WHETHER THE DIFFERENT VIEWS CAN BE BRIDGED. THIS I CANNOT JUDGE UNTIL WE HAVE HAD FURTHER CONVERSATIONS. IF THERE WERE NOT SOME POSSIBILITY OF BRIDGING THESE VIEWS WE WOULD NOT HAVE UNDERTAKEN THE JOURNEY.

Q. ON THE QUESTION OF GUARANTEES TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY IN RHODESIA -- IN ADDITION TO THE PERHAPS BILLION DOLLARS THAT IS BEING TALKED ABOUT TO SAFEGUARD THE WHITE MINORITY IN RHODESIA, THERE SEEMS TO BE ANOTHER ELEMENT, AN ELEMENT CONCERNING THE RELATION

- SHIP OR SOME GUARANTEES BEING GIVEN BY A BLACK MAJORITY GOVERNMENT TO THE WHITE COMMUNITY IN RHODESIA. NOW, WOULD THESE GUARANTEES INCLUDE THINGS LIKE THE RIGHT TO LIVE, WORK AND VOTE IN RHODESIA LIKE ANY OTHER CITIZEN, OR IS THERE SOMETING ELSE INVOLVED?

SECRETARY. IT HAS ALWAYS BEEN MY UNDERSTANDING FROM THE AFRICAN PRESIDENTS THAT THEY WANT A SOCIETY THAT IS NOT BASED ON ANY RACIAL DISCRIMINATION FROM EITHER SIDE. I HAVE NEVER BEEN GIVEN ANY OTHER INDICATION. WHAT SPECIFIC GUARANTEES WILL BE WORKED OUT IN THIS CONNECTION WILL DEPEND ON A CONFERENCE, IF THERE IS A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT, THAT WILL EVENTUALLY HAVE TO TAKE PLACE BETWEEN UNCLASSIFIED

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RHODESIAN NATIONALISTS AND THE RHODESIAN WHITE SETTLERS UNDER BRITISH AEGIS. I AM IN NO POSITION TO GO INTO THE PRECISE DETAILS. THE UNITED STATES IS NOT PRESCRIBING THE DETAILS OF THE SETTLEMENT. THE UNITED STATES INDICATES ITS GENERAL ATTITUDE ON THE KIND OF SOLUTION IT FAVORS, BUT IT CANNOT COMPEL THE PARTIES TO ACCEPT THAT PREFERENCE.

Q. CERTAIN CIRCLES HAVE SAID THAT THE SUDDEN INTEREST THE UNITED STATES HAS SHOWN IN THE SOUTHER AFRICA PROBLEM IS BECAUSE OF THE FEAR OF COMMUNISM. WOULD YOU SUBSCRIBE TO THAT?

SECRETARY. WELL, I DO NOT KNOW WHO THESE CIRCLES ARE. ON MY PREVIOUS VISIT ALL OF THE LEADERS I MET WERE VERY CRITICAL OF THE UNITED STATES FOR NOT SHOWING SUFFICIENT INTEREST IN AFRICA AND URGED US TO SHOW INTEREST IN AFRICA. NOW WE ARE SHOWING INTEREST IN AFRICA.

WHY CAN YOU NOT ASCRIBE IT TO THE PERSUASIVENESS OF YOUR LEADERS? (LAUGHTER)

Q. MR SECRETARY, WOULDN'T IT BE LOGICAL FOR ANYBODY, FOR AN AFRICAN IN PARTICULAR, TO TAKE THE UNITED STATES INITIATIVE SUSPICIOUSLY, PARTICULARLY WHEN YOU CONSIDER THAT IT IS THE AMERICANS WHO ARE PROPPING UP THE SMITH REGIME ECONOMICALLY?

SECRETARY. WHAT WE ARE SEEKING TO ACHIEVE IS WHAT AFRICAN LEADERS HAVE BEEN ASKING FOR. EVERY MOVE WE HAVE MADE HAS BEEN MADE IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE LEADERS OF AFRICA. IF THE LEADERS OF AFRICA ARE SUSPICIOUS AND IF THE LEADERS OF AFRICA BELIEVE THAT THE AMERICAN INITIATIVE CANNOT BE HELPFUL, THEN WE WILL OF COURSE STOP THIS INITIATIVE. WE WILL HAVE TO BE JUDGED BY THE RESULTS. AND WE HAVE TRIED IN GOOD FAITH TO PREVENT A CONFLICT, THE MAJOR IMPACT OF WHICH WILL BE ON AFRICA. IT IS NOW UP TO AFRICANS TO DECIDE WHETHER THEY WILL WISH TO CONTINUE TO COOPERATE WITH THIS OR NOT. SO FAR EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN DONE HAS BEEN WITH THE ENCOURAGEMENT AND WITH THE APPROVAL OF AFRICAN LEADERS.

Q. MR SECRETARY, THERE ARE AMERICAN TROOPS IN (INAUDIBLE).

A. THE UNITED STATES HAS NO OBJECTION TO THE MPLA AS A POLITICAL FORCE. THE FRELIMO IN MOZAMBIQUE, WHOSE POLITICAL VIEWS ARE NEARLY INDISTINGUISHABLE FROM MPLA, WAS RECOGNIZED BY THE UNCLASSIFIED

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UNITED STATES AS SOON AS IT TOOK OFFICE, AND WE HAVE ESTABLISHED A REASONABLE RELATIONSHIP WITH MOZAMBIQUE. OUR OBJECTION TO ANGOLA WAS THE MASSIVE INFUSION OF SOVIET MILITARY HELP TO BEGIN WITH, FOLLOWED BY THE SENDING OF AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE WHICH WAS NOT, OR COULD NOT, HAVE HAPPENED ON THE PART OF SO SMALL A COUNTRY AS CUBA WITHOUT SOVIET SUPPORT. THEREFORE IT SEEMED TO US A MASSIVE OUTSIDE INTERVENTION INTO THE AFFAIRS OF AFRICA. THIS IS THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES ON THAT SUBJECT AND IT IS A QUITE DIFFERENT MATTER WHETHER AN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE APPEARS IN A CIVIL WAR OR AS PART OF A NORMAL ALLIANCE RELATIONSHIP.

1. MR SECRETARY, LAST WEEK THE SUMMIT CONFERENCE WAS ATTENDED BY PRESIDENT AUGUSTINHO NETO. IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT YOUR GOVERNMENT DOES NOT RECOGNIZE HIS GOVERNMENT, DO YOU EXPECT YOU MIGHT HAVE TO MEET WITH HIM AT SOME POINT AND HOW WOULD YOU SURMOUNT THIS PROBLEM?

SECRETARY. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT I WILL MEET PRESIDENT NETO ON THIS TRIP.

Q. LAST MONTH THE STATE DEPARTMENT HAD STATED THAT THE SOUTH AFRICAN PROMISE TO GRANT NAMIBIA INDEPENDENCE DID NOT GO FAR



ENOUGH. WHAT WOULD YOU FIND ACCEPTABLE IN TERMS OF INDEPENDENCE?

SECRETARY. WE HAVE STATED THAT SIMPLY GIVING A DATE FOR INDEPENDENCE DID NOT GO FAR ENOUGH. OUR VIEW IS THAT THERE HAS TO BE A PROCEDURE BY WHICH ALL AUTHENTIC GROUPS CAN PARTICIPATE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND A CONFERENCE WHICH IS ACCEPTABLE TO THOSE PARTIES MOST CONCERNED.

Q. ON THE QUESTION OF SOUTH AFRICA, I UNDERSTAND THAT YOU DID DISCUSS THIS WITH PRESIDENT NYERERE TODAY, BUT IT WAS WIDELY REPORTED THAT DURING YOUR TALKS WITH PRIME MINISTER VORSTER IN ZURICH YOU WERE SEEKING TO FIND OUT WHETHER OR NOT VORSTER WAS WILLING TO DETACH OR SEPARATE THE FUTURE OF SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE FUTURES OF NAMIBIA AND ZIMBABWE. YOU HAVE YOURSELF STATED ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT YOU SEE THE NECESSITY FOR THE END OF THE APARTHEID SYSTEM IN SOUTH AFRICA. BUT THE LOGICAL

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EXTENSION OF ENDING APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA IS BLACK MAJORITY RULE. AND THEREFORE IT WOULD SEEM THAT ANY DETACHMENT OR SEPARATION OF THE ISSUES OF SOUTHERN AFRICA WOULD ONLY BE A MATTER OF TIME. IF IT IS CORRECT TO ASSUME THAT EVENTUALLY WE WOULD BE LOOKING FOR BLACK MAJORITY RULE IN SOUTH AFRICA, THEN WHAT KIND OF TIME PERIOD ARE WE TALKING ABOUT? ARE WE TALKING ABOUT ONE YEAR, TEN YEARS OR MAYBE A HUNDRED YEARS?

SECRETARY. I WOULD NOT WANT TO SPECULATE ABOUT THE AMOUNT OF TIME. YOU ARE QUITE RIGHT THAT TIME IS WHAT IS IMPLIED BY THE PHRASE OF SEPARATING THE PROBLEM. BUT TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE IF A PEACEFUL SOLUTION TO SO COMPLEX A PROBLEM AS THAT OF SOUTH AFRICA IS TO BE FOUND. WE HAVE NO PRECISE TIMETABLE. SOME TIMETABLES WERE GIVEN PUBLICLY BY AFRICAN LEADERS. WE HAVE NO TIMETABLE OF OUR OWN.

Q. THANK YOU, MR SECRETARY.  
KISSINGER UNQTE: HABIB

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